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Punishment and Sociocultural Development in the Later Middle Ages 
 
 
SCOPVS LEGIS EST, AVT VT EV QVE PVNIT EMENDET, AVT POENA EIVS 
CAETEROS MELIORES REDDET AVT SVBLATIS MALIS CAETERI 
SECVRIORES VIVAT. 
 
The aim of law is either to correct him who is punished, or to improve the others by 
his example, or to provide that the population live more securely by removing 
wrongdoers. 
(Orenstein 2001, 177) 
 
Thus reads the inscription beneath the engraving of Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s Justitia, a 
poignant representation of punishment, torture, and execution in mid-sixteenth century France. 
The left half of the engraving, a showcase for some of the various forms of public execution and 
punishment commissioned throughout the later Middle Ages, exhibits wrongdoers being 
crucified, hanged, broken on the wheel, and burned at the stake. One man is seen kneeling in 
what appears to be a pool of blood, presumably not his own, as he anticipates the ultimate blow 
of the executioner, while another man is forced to swill an unidentified liquid whilst he is 
simultaneously stretched and tortured on the rack. Also visible in the engraving are a few of the 
punishments reserved for lesser crimes, such as flagellation and dismemberment.  
Many modern explanations for the justification of punishment tend to rely on the functions 
of punishment elucidated by Bruegel’s Justitia. Writing more than four centuries after Bruegel’s 
death, Thorsten Sellin similarly suggests that “the services to the community that the death 
penalty might be expected to perform are (1) the satisfaction of the demand for retribution by 
making the criminal pay for his misdeed with his life; (2) the realization of the hope that his 
execution will discourage others from committing capital crimes, i.e., general deterrence; and (3) 
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the removal of the danger that his survival would pose to society, i.e., prevention” (1980, 6). For 
centuries, scholars have attributed the function of justice and punishment to one of these three 
observations, with each explanation based upon one of two antithetical theories of punishment: 
retributivism and utilitarianism. The objective of this paper is to examine the contributions of 
each theory as applied to past and current justifications for punishment in the later Middle Ages, 
as well as to provide the basis and understanding for its application to a sociocultural framework. 
 
Theories of Punishment: Retributivism and Utilitarianism 
 
For more than half a millennium, historians writing about punishment and execution in the 
later Middle Ages have conformed their analyses with the premises of either the retributive 
theory of punishment or the utilitarian theory of punishment. Retributivism suggests that 
punishment is justified because the offender deserves to be punished. According to Michael 
Cavadino and James Dingan, retributivism “looks backwards in time, to the offense. It is the fact 
that the offender has committed a wrongful act that deserves punishment, not the consequences 
of punishment, that is important to the retributivist” (2007, 44). Punishment is therefore justified 
by retributivists as an end within itself. It is in this idea of just desert that retributivists find 
justification for their theory of punishment. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, takes into 
consideration the perceived benefits to society that are produced from the punishment and 
suffering of the wrongdoer. The utilitarian theory therefore attempts to justify punishment by 
nature of its extrinsic social value. As C. L. Ten explains, utilitarians believe that "the right act is 
that which produces the greatest utility, or is most conducive to the welfare of all those affected 
by the act" (1987, 3). Punishment thus serves as the means to a desirable social outcome because 
the positive consequences of punishment outweigh the negative consequences of non-
punishment.  
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As mentioned earlier, each of the three functions of punishment correspond to either the 
retributive or the utilitarian theory of punishment. The first of the these functions, the correction 
of the offender, is consonant with the claims of the retributive theory. Unlike the second and 
third functions, which take into consideration the social consequences of punishment, the first 
function focuses entirely on the individual. If a transgression warrants punishment, the criminal 
is corrected. The offender thus deserves, or rather receives, something that he or she would not 
otherwise have had. In this sense, retributivism “strikes the offender … [and] cancels his debt to 
society” (Sellin 1980, 6). The second and third functions of punishment are consistent with the 
notions of the utilitarian theory. The second function, punishment of the offender as an example 
to the other members of society, corresponds to the utilitarian principle of deterrence. As such, 
the spectacle of punishment serves to dissuade others from committing acts of crime. The third 
function, the removal of the individual from society, also pertains to the utilitarian theory in that 
the absence of the offender precludes him or her from perpetrating additional acts of social 
deviation and detriment. In both instances, the future consequences of punishment are preferred 
to the extant conditions concomitant with non-punishment.     
Although the matter of justification as it relates to public execution and punishment in the 
later Middle Ages has for centuries been a subject of contentious debate, a preponderance of 
historians have elected to focus on the didactic, or utilitarian, functions of punishment. In most 
instances, these scholars cite the deterrence of the would-be offender as the most common 
justification for punishment. As such, both the administration of justice and the spectacle of 
punishment wrought to benefit the members of society. The fourteenth century works of 
Neapolitan scholar Lucas de Penna (1320-1390) demonstrate this utilitarian function of 
deterrence when he reasons that the purpose of public execution and other forms of punishment 
 4
is to avert future crime by “inculcating fear of punishment in potential criminals” (Sellin 1980, 
76). Writing on the subject of punishment in fifteenth century France, Christine de Pizan (1363-
1430) similarly contends that “no one will want to become evil when everyone will know that 
you are their punisher … in this way there will necessarily be peace among [the] people, which is 
the glory and dignity of every kingdom” (Gauvard 1999, 26-7). Recent scholarship likewise 
suggests that public execution and other forms of punishment common to the later Middle Ages 
served a utilitarian purpose. As Esther Cohen explains, public executions served as “both 
punishment and lesson … while one suffered the penalty, others benefitted from the lesson” 
(1993, 149). It is worth mentioning, however, that there is some division among adherents of the 
utilitarian theory concerning the efficacy of punishment as a mechanism for deterrence. 
According to J. A. Sharpe, “the deterrent effects of public execution, despite the wishes of the 
state [and] the energies of the clergy … should not, perhaps, be overestimated” (1985, 167). 
Sellin likewise suggests that although public executions and other forms of punishment in the 
Middle Ages were supposed “to foster law obedience by the subsidiary deterrent effect they 
would have on potential offenders … deeply rooted sentiments of primitive justice, animating the 
law and its enforcers, called primarily for retribution” (1980, 75).  
 Michel Foucault, in his infamous work Discipline and Punish, similarly suggests that 
public execution and torture acted as a means of deterrence, although modern historians are often 
critical of Foucault's surmise that punishment functioned primarily as an instrument of repressive 
social control. According to David Garland, Foucault's social control of punishment model 
exposes modern scholars to assumptions that are both “intellectually constraining” and 
“counterproductive” (1990, 3). Trevor Dean moreover argues that Discipline and Punish “has 
had the unfortunate consequence of reinforc[ing] older opinions … which allowed for their idea 
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of late medieval justice to be filled by images of extreme cruelty” (2001, 120). Dean's pointed 
criticism is also directed towards Johan Huizinga, who, like Foucault, suggests that life in the 
Middle Ages was both dominated by and obsessed with immeasurable acts of ruthless barbarism. 
“So violent and motley was life,” writes Huizinga, “that it bore the mixed smell of blood and 
roses. The men of that time always oscillate between the fear of hell and the most naïve joy, 
between cruelty and tenderness, between harsh asceticism and insane attachment to the delights 
of this world, between hatred and goodness, always running to extremes” (Huizinga 1954, 27). It 
is worth emphasizing once more that modern historians are generally unreceptive to the 
conjectures of Foucault and Huizinga. Recent scholarship also remains skeptical of authors who 
insist without evidence that punishment functioned primarily as a method for repressive social 
control. 
 
Sociocultural Foundations: Utilitarianism Meets Esotericism 
 Although most historians subscribe to the consequentialist underpinnings of the utilitarian 
theory, this does not mean that scholarship, current or past, is or has been confined exclusively to 
a singular, cohesive theory of punishment. Recent trends, however, demonstrate that historians 
are now grasping for a more comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach to the concepts of 
justice and punishment in the later Middle Ages. As Sharpe contends, historical analysis of 
public execution and other forms of punishment should be read “in a broader social and cultural 
context” (1985, 147). Danielle Westerhof similarly suggests that public executions ought to be 
considered “in a wider sociocultural context,” adding further that scholars should bring into 
disrepute “the narrower view of these events as state-controlled legalized acts of repressive 
violence or as emotive expressions of personal hatred and frustration” (2007, 106). This notion 
of a sociocultural context mentioned by Sharpe and Westerhof is also elucidated by Cohen when 
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she proposes that “the law was meant not only to punish but primarily to redress the social 
balance.” “Implicit in the actual execution of justice,” Cohen continues, “was the perception of 
the law as a vehicle for human relations rather than a behavior-control mechanism” (1990, 286-
7). What all three authors appear to propose is that public executions and other forms of 
punishment in the later Middle Ages served as a means of social engineering that, in the broadest 
of esoteric strokes, reinforced the social fabric of the times by contributing to the development of 
both the individual and society.  
 The basis for the sociocultural framework expounded by Sharpe, Westerhof, and Cohen 
is derived from Fritz Heider's Balance Theory, which attempts to explain human interaction in 
terms of benefit and harm. As Heider explains, a balanced state is “a situation in which the 
relations among entities fit together harmoniously; there is no stress towards change. A basic 
assumption is that sentiment relations and unit relations tend toward a balanced state … if a 
balanced state does not exist, then forces toward this state will arise. If a change is not possible, 
the state of imbalance will produce tension” (1983, 201). The following example, a simplified 
rendering of Heider's model of interpersonal relations (1983, 208), reflects the ways in which 
public execution and other forms of punishment and torture promoted development and stability 
in the later Middle Ages: 
        
The model on the left reflects a balanced sociocultural structure. When the relations among 
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authority, society, and the individual “fit together harmoniously,” that is, when all three entities 
function in accordance with the rule of law and other established norms, the sociocultural 
structure is balanced and “there is no stress towards change” (1983, 201). If one of these entities 
runs counter to the forces of a balanced state, in this case as the result of negative action or 
deviation by the individual, the other two forces of authority and society will act upon the 
individual to redress the imbalance.  
 Elaine Scarry argues that the balancing effect of these forces, the “deconstruction” of the 
criminal's world, made possible the “construction and reconstruction” of the existing social 
structure in the later Middle Ages (1985, 161). Marla Carlson believes similarly that the ritual of 
public execution “erase[d] and reinforce[d] social differentiation” (2003, 80). In either case, the 
authors both suggest that the corrective nature of extant sociocultural forces allowed for the 
simultaneous “making and unmaking” of reality (Scarry 1985). Westerhof likewise contends that 
public executions functioned not to “eradicate the memory of the criminal and crime” but rather 
to preserve the memory of both, acting as a sort of utilitarian deterrence for the rest of society. 
(2007, 105). Scholars have also emphasized the “spectacle of suffering” (Spierenburg 1984) as 
an important component of the social engineering process in the Middle Ages. As Mitchell 
Merback suggests, communal participation was crucial to medieval perceptions of crime and the 
rule of law (1999, 32). Pieter Spierenburg similarly reasons that in order for the punishments to 
be effective, the public had “to see that 'justice reigned' … [since] the reign of justice implied the 
presence of persons powerful enough to catch and punish transgressors of the law” (1984, 55). 
The correction of the individual in the Middle Ages thus preserved the social order and ensured 
the stability of the entire system.  
 Jean Froissart’s account of the fourteenth century public execution of Hugh Despenser 
the Younger demonstrates the sociocultural dynamics of punishment in the later Middle Ages. 
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The following description takes place after Despenser had been “bound to the smallest, thinnest, 
and most weakly horse” and ceremoniously paraded to the sound of music throughout a number 
of English towns: 
 
First, he was dragged on a hurdle through all the streets of Hereford, to the sound of 
horns and trumpets, until he reached the main square of the town, where all the 
people were assembled. There he was tied to a long ladder, so that everyone could 
see him. A big fire had been lit in the square. When he had been tied up, his member 
and his testicles were first cut off, because he was a heretic and a sodomite, even, it 
was said, with the King, and this is why the King had driven away the Queen on his 
suggestion. When his private parts had been cut off they were thrown into the fire to 
burn, and afterwards his heart was torn from his body and thrown into the fire, 
because he was a false-hearted traitor … After Sir Hugh Despenser had been cut up 
in the way described, his head was struck off and sent to the city of London. His 
body was divided into four quarters, which were sent to the four principle cities of 
England after London. (Froissart 1981, 44) 
 
The public humiliation and morbid execution of Hugh Despenser the Younger might perhaps 
compel the reader to reconsider the criticisms of Foucault and Huizinga. But if, as Foucault 
suggests, public executions indeed functioned as ceremonial "exercise[s] of terror" (1977, 49), 
one might feel inclined to ask the question: for whom? Certainly not the spectators. That “all the 
people” of the town had gathered to partake in the darkest moments of Young Despenser's life 
suggests their desire to be part of something greater than just themselves. This sort of communal 
interest and involvement demonstrates not the presence of a crowd repressed by the state, but 
rather that of an audience fascinated by the rule of law and the implementation of justice. Sharpe 
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similarly contends that public executions were “not simple display[s] of brutality intended to 
cow or entertain some animalistic mob.” Rather, Sharpe maintains that public executions were a 
matter of “ceremony and ritual,” adding further that “the reactions which they aimed to incite 
among spectators were … more complicated than mere terror” (1985, 146-7).  
Relevant also to Froissart’s account of Hugh Despenser’s death are the statements of 
Bruegel and Sellin. In this instance, it would appear that all three justifications of punishment are 
valid: Despenser’s death served first to redress the social imbalance of his crime by dispensing 
his just desert; second to warn others of the consequences of his transgressions; and third to 
improve society by eliminating the threat of any future transgressions on the part of Despenser. 
As such, both the retributive and utilitarian justifications for punishment are evidenced by the 
execution of Hugh Despenser the Younger. According to Froissart, the punishment administered 
to Despenser was not inconsistent with the punishments dispensed to other traitors. Accordingly, 
Despenser’s execution served a retributive purpose in that he received a just desert consonant 
with those meted out to other conspirators at the time. Hugh Despenser’s execution is also 
consistent with the utilitarian justifications for punishment in that the consequences of his 
extirpation functioned ultimately to advance the social welfare, presumably in the forms of 
deterrence and prevention. When these forces collide, the sociocultural dynamics of Hugh 
Despenser’s execution become more apparent, and thus add new meaning to Spierenburg’s 
spectacle of suffering. The exemplum of Hugh Despenser the Younger benefitted society not 
only because it deterred and prevented future occurrences of crime and social deviation, but also 
because it contributed to the growth of both the individual and society by reinforcing structure 
and stability in the Middle Ages. As Spierenburg similarly suggests, public executions 
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influenced "two areas of social development: the development of mentalities and changes in 
human organization" (1984, 200).  
This paper has considered the application and meaning of punishment in the later Middle 
Ages. The retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment help to explain the reasons for such 
punishment, while primary sources such as Bruegel’s Justitia and Froissart’s account of the 
execution of Hugh Despesner the Younger elucidate further the manner in which punishment 
likely played out in practice. Although these events are far from universal, such occurrences are 
neither isolated nor infrequent. When examined through a sociocultural framework, these 
episodes provide an avenue for a better understanding of the sometimes ‘horrific’ episodes of 
punishment and public execution in the later Middle Ages.  
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